University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1994

Political Equality and Unintended Consequences
Cass R. Sunstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Political Equality and Unintended Consequences," 94 Columbia Law Review 1390
(1994).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

POLITICAL EQUALITY AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
Cass R. Sunstein*
It is a familiar point that government regulation that is amply justi-

fied in principle may go terribly wrong in practice. Minimum wage laws,
for example, appear to reduce employment.1 Stringent regulation of
new sources of air pollution may aggravate pollution problems, by perpetuating the life of old, especially dirty sources. 2 If government closely
monitors the release of information, there may be less information. 3 Unintended consequences of this kind can make regulation futile or even

self-defeating. 4 By futile regulation, I mean measures that do not bring
about the desired consequences. By self-defeating regulation, I mean
measures that actually make things worse from the standpoint of their
strongest and most public-spirited advocates. We do not lack examples of

both of these phenomena. It is unfortunate but true that current campaign finance laws may well provide more illustrations.

Some campaign finance regulation is amply justified in principle. As
we will see, there is no good reason to allow disparities in wealth to be

translated into disparities in political power. A well-functioning democracy distinguishes between market processes of purchase and sale on the

one hand and political processes of voting and reason-giving on the
other. Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring not only that
political liberties exist as a formal and technical matter, but also that
those liberties have real value to the people who have them.5 The
achievement of political equality is an important constitutional goal.
Nonetheless, many imaginable campaign finance restrictions would be fu* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law School
and Department of Political Science. I am grateful to Richard Posner and David Strauss
for helpful comments and to Thomas Brown for excellent research assistance.
1. See Finis Welch, Minimum Wages: Issues and Evidence 34-38 (1978). But see
Stephen Machin & Alan Manning, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Wage Dispersion
and Employment: Evidence from the U.K. Wages Councils, 47 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 319
(1994) (concluding that the minimum wage has either no effect or a positive effect on
employment).
2. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1256, 1281-84 (1981).
3. See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 657, 678
(1985).
4. Cf. Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy
11-12, 43-45 (1991) (citing two arguments: the perversity thesis, which asserts that "the
attempt to push society in a certain direction will result in its moving.., in the opposite
direction," and the futility thesis which asserts that "[any] attempt at change... will be
largely surface, facade, cosmetic, [and] hence illusory").
5. See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism 324-31 (1993) ("The first principle of
justice [should include] the guarantee.., that the worth of the political liberties to all
citizens, whatever their social or economic position, [is] approximately equal.").
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tile or self-defeating. To take a familiar example, it is now well-known
that restrictions on individual expenditures-designed to reduce
influence-peddling-can help fuel the use of political action committees
(PACs), and thus increase the phenomenon of influence-peddling. 6 This
is merely one of a number of possible illustrations.
I can venture no exhaustive account here, and I attempt to describe
possibilities rather than certainties. But one of my principal goals is to
outline some of the harmful but unintended 7 consequences of campaign
finance restrictions. I conclude with some brief notes on what strategies
might be most likely to avoid the risk of unintended (or intended but
unarticulated) bad consequences. My basic claim here is that we might
attempt to avoid rigid command-and-control strategies for restricting expenditures, and experiment with more flexible, incentive-based approaches. In this way the regulation of campaign expenditures might be
brought in line with recent innovations in regulatory practice generally.8
I.

CAMPAIGN

FINANCE REFORM: JUSTIFICATIONS AND THE
JUDICIAL RESPONSE

A. Arguments for Campaign FinanceReform
In principle, the case for campaign finance regulation is very strong.
We can identify at least three central grounds for such regulation. 9 First
and most obvious, perhaps, is the need to protect the electoral process
from both the appearance and the reality of "quid pro quo" exchanges
between contributors and candidates. Such exchanges occur whenever
contributors offer dollars in return for political favors. The purchase of
votes or of political favors is a form of corruption-a large issue in recent
campaigns. 10 Corruption is inconsistent with the view that public officials
should act on the basis of the merits of proposals, and not on the basis of
their personal economic interest, or even the interest in increasing their
6. See infra text accompanying note 52.
7. Of course some of these effects might be intended.
8. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 156-88 (1982) (describing
alternatives to classical regulation); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L.
171,182-83 (1988) (arguing that a reform of environmental regulation relying on market
incentives will improve both meaningful democratic debate and regulatory efficiency). For

a popular treatment of regulatory innovation, see David Osborne & Ted Gaebler,
Reinventing Government 15, 301-05 (1992) (suggesting that governments employ a
market-based regulatory policy which would operate by incentives rather than by
commands).
9. I do not deal here with the simple interest in ensuring that enormous sums of
money are devoted to something other than political advertising. This interest is
legitimate, of course, especially if regulation is seen as a means of eliminating the
prisoner's dilemma faced by all candidates, each of whom must decide whether or not to
advertise without knowing what other candidates will do.
10. See, e.g., Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money, Elections and Political
Reform 67-69 (4th ed. 1992) (describing the Keating Five Affair).
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campaign finances. Of course consideration of the merits will often involve people's preferences, and of course a willingness to pay cash may
reflect preferences. But the link between particular cash payments and
any responsible judgment about the merits is extremely weak. Laws
should not be purchased and sold; the spectre of quid pro quo exchanges
violates this principle.
The second interest, independent of corruption, involves political
equality. This is a time-honored goal in American constitutional
thought." People who are able to organize themselves in such a way as
to spend large amounts of cash should not be able to influence politics
more than people who are not similarly able. Certainly economic equality is not required in a democracy; but it is most troublesome if people
with a good deal of money are allowed to translate their wealth into political influence. It is equally troublesome if the electoral process translates
poverty into an absence of political influence. Of course economic inequalities cannot be made altogether irrelevant for politics. But the link
can be diminished between wealth or poverty on the one hand and political influence on the other. The "one person-one vote" rule exemplifies
the commitment to political equality. Limits on campaign expenditures
are continuous with that rule.
The third interest is in some ways a generalization of the first two.
Campaign finance laws might promote the goal of ensuring political deliberation and reason-giving. Politics should not simply register existing
preferences and their intensities, especially as these are measured by private willingness to pay. In the American constitutional tradition, politics
has an important deliberative function. The constitutional system aspires
to a form of "government by discussion." 12 Grants of cash to candidates
might compromise that goal by, for example, encouraging legislatures to
vote in accordance with private interest rather than reasons.
The goals of political equality and political deliberation are related
to the project of distinguishing between the appropriate spheres of economic markets and politics.' 3 In democratic politics, a norm of equality
11. Thus in his discussion of the "evil" of parties, Madison lists as his first remedy,
'establishing a political equality among all." James Madison, 14 The Papers of James
Madison 197 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). It should be noted, however, that for
much of our history the principle of political equality was construed much more narrowly,
for the franchise itself was not given to all.
12. See Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism
74-77 (1993).
13. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 141-67 (1993); Michael
Walzer, Spheres of Justice 95-123 (1983); see also Cass R Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 849-51 (1994) (considering economic and political
values may entail blocking some marketplace exchanges despite our general respect for

voluntary contractual agreements when such exchanges involve or encourage improper
kinds of valuation). For discussion of the relationship between corruption and political
equality, see David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1371-75 (1994).
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is important: disparities in wealth ought not lead to disparities in power
over government. Similarly, democracy requires adherence to the norm
of reason-giving. Political outcomes should not be based only on intensities of preferences as these are reflected in the criterion of private willingness to pay. Taken together, the notions of equality and reason-giving
embody a distinctive conception of political respect. Markets are operated on the basis of quite different understandings. People can purchase
things because they want them, and they need not offer or even have
reasons for their wants. Markets embody their own conception of equality insofar as they entail a principle of "one dollar-one 'vote'"; but this is
not the conception of equality appropriate to the political sphere.
To distinguish between the market and politics is not to deny that an
expenditure of money on behalf of a candidate or a cause qualifies as
"speech" for first amendment purposes. Such an expenditure might well
be intended and received as a contribution to social deliberation. Many
people give money in order to promote discussion of a position that they
favor. Indeed, we might see the ability to accumulate large sums of
money as at least a rough indicator that large numbers of people are
intensely interested in a candidate's success. If a candidate can accumulate a lot of money, it is probable that many people like what she has to
say, or that even if the number of supporters is not so great, their level of
enthusiasm is high indeed. In this way we might take the ability to attract
a large amount of money to reveal something important-if not decisive-in a deliberative democracy. If and because political dissenters are
able to attract funds, they might be able to do especially well in the political "marketplace." This possibility should hardly be disparaged.
In this regard, it is perhaps insufficiently appreciated that a system
without limits on financial contributionsfavors people who can attract money
without, however, simply favoring the rich over the poor. In theory, at least,
some poor people may be able to attract a lot of money if their political
commitments find broad support-from, say, a lot of relatively poor people, or from a smaller but intensely interested number of rich ones. Of
course it is hardly unusual for a rich candidate to find it impossible to
obtain sufficient funds, because other people are not at all interested in
providing support. Many candidates with large personal fortunes have
failed for just this reason.
These points are not decisive in favor of a system of laissez-faire for
political expenditures and contributions. The correlation between public
enthusiasm and the capacity to attract money is crude. There is a large
disparity between donations and intensity of interest in a candidate. Candidate A might, for example, attract large sums of money from wealthy
people; but A's supporters may be less interested in her success than Candidate B's poorer supporters are interested in B's success, even though

HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1393 1994
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B's supporters donate less money.' 4 Moreover, as I have emphasized, a
democracy is concerned with much more than numbers and intensities of
preferences.
At the very least, however, an expenditure of money is an important
means by which people communicate ideas, and the First Amendment
requires a strong justification for any government regulation of an important means of communication. We might therefore think of campaign
finance laws as viewpoint-neutral and even content-neutral restrictions on
political speech. 15 At least if the laws are fair, the particular content of
the speech-the message that is being urged-is irrelevant to whether
the campaign finance restriction attaches. The area is especially difficult
because while these restrictions can be severe, the government can point
to strong reasons in their support.
B.

The Law

By far the most important campaign finance case is of course Buckley
v. Valeo,16 which must now be counted as one of the most vilified
Supreme Court decisions of the post-World War II era. I offer a brief
summary. In Buckley, the Court invalidated all restrictions on campaign
expenditures. According to the Court, such restrictions are a kind of
First Amendment "taking" from some speakers, perhaps rich ones, for the
benefit of others, perhaps poor ones. In the key sentence, the Court declared that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 17 If the purpose of such laws
were to increase political equality, they would be constitutionally unacceptable. The goal of political equality could not be invoked to stop people from spending money on themselves or on candidates of their choice.
According to the Court, redistributive arguments for campaign finance
laws are therefore impermissible; they amount to a silencing of some for
the benefit of others.'8
14. The lack of correlation between ability to attract money and intensity of interests
is a special case of the disparity between aggregated willingness to pay and utility. See
Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 237, 242-46
(1985).
15. The restrictions are not entirely content-neutral, because political speech relating
to campaigns is being singled out for special treatment. But this should not affect the
analysis. Content-based regulations-like a ban on advertising on buses-are disfavored in
part because we rightly suspect that illegitimate motivations lie behind them. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 168-77 (1993). The content
discrimination in campaign finance laws-singling out campaign-related speech-is not
similarly a basis for suspicion. On the other hand, the institutional interest of incumbent
legislators does justify a large measure ofjudicial and public skepticism about any reforms
that legislators favor. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
17. Id. at 48-49.
18. See id. Of course financial inequalities are not the only kinds of inequalities built
into a democratic system. Some people may not be able to speak well because of an
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1394 1994
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The Court did not say that the First Amendment would forbid all
campaign finance laws. Limits on campaign contributionsare acceptable.
Those limits could be justified not on the objectionable ground of political equality (restricting the speech of some to enhance the relative voice
of others), but as an entirely legitimate attempt to combat both the appearance and reality of corruption in the form of political favors in return for cash. Government may therefore restrict the amount of money
that people can give to candidates for elective office. 19
By contrast, limits on campaign expenditures are indeed impermissible, since those limits are not easilyjustified by the anti-corruption rationale. The central point is that someone who is spending money on her
own campaign, or advertising explicitly on her own for a candidate, is not
giving money to a candidate. The reality and appearance of corruption
are therefore minimized. 20 According to the Court, limits on expenditures are really an effort to prevent spending by people having or able to
attract a substantial amount of money. Since corruption is not at issue,
these limits are illegitimate.
In addition, limits on expenditures are far more intrusive than limits
on contributions, since expenditure limits do not leave people free to
express their views through other means. The Buckley Court rejected the
view that limits on expenditures were necessary to prevent evasion of the
limits on contributions. It did not believe that people would form tacit
with candidates to spend money
but mutually understood arrangements
21
contributions.
allowable
of
excess
in
So much for Buckley, which sets out the broad contours of constitutional law. The decision leaves many uncertainties. The post-Buckley cases
reveal that there are enormous complexities in holding the line between
22
First, it is
regulation of contributions and regulation of expenditures.
not clear that this distinction is relevant, since expenditures on behalf of
a candidate can create some of the dangers of contributions. Candidates
often know who spends money on their behalf,23 and for this reason, an
expenditure may in some contexts give rise to the same reality and appearance of corruption. A limit on expenditures may be necessary to preabsence of education, and inequalities of this kind may also undermine the commitment
to political equality. But short of improving education, it is hard to see how regulatory
tools might helpfully respond to this kind of inequality.
19. See id. at 23-29.
20. See id. at 39-59.
21. See id. at 45-47, 53, 55-56.
22. Compare Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1395 (1990)
(holding that a ban on independent expenditures by corporations using general treasury
funds was constitutional as applied to nonprofit Chamber of Commerce) with FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986) (holding that federal ban on
general treasury expenditures was unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit corporation
formed to advance pro-life position).
23. For examples, see Dan Clawson et al., Money Talks: Corporate PACs and Political
Influence 75-79 (1992).
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vent evasion of the limit on contributions. Second, the distinction is not
crisp even if it is relevant. Suppose thatJones purchases an advertisement
in the newspaper for candidate Smith. Might this not be thought a contribution? The slipperiness of the distinction has increased in light of the
dramatic rise of political action committees (PACs), a development that,
as we will soon see, was stimulated by Buckley itself.
PACs are created precisely in order to exert political influence as a
result of financial contributions. This raises an obvious question: Is a
grant of money to a PAC a contribution or is it an expenditure? It might
be thought to be an expenditure if it does not involve the award of money
to a particular, identified candidate; many PACs are devoted to numerous
candidates and to general causes. The grant of money to a PAC may thus
not involve the risk of "corruption" in the simple sense of an exchange of
money for political favors. On the other hand, the PAC could spend a
great deal of money on behalf of one candidate; it could be organized by
a close friend or ally of the candidate; it could be closely identified with
one or a few candidates. Indeed, in practice a PAC could be nearly indistinguishable from the candidate herself. It is easy for candidates to find
out who has given money to PACs, and to reward contributors accordingly. In addition, PACs often have unusual access to candidates. If we
are concerned about disproportionate access and political influence
based on financial contributions, we might well be concerned about
PACs. In this light, concern about corruption, as well as political equality
and political deliberation, would support treating grants of money to
24
PACs as contributions.
Moreover, people usually know that contributions to PACs will go to
certain candidates and not to others, and there is thus some risk of corruption here as well. A limit on contributions to PACs is far less intrusive
than a limit on all expenditures; it does leave the individual with the option of making ordinary expenditures on his own. Finally, PACs are often
said to have unusual political influence and for this reason to be a distinctive threat to political equality and political deliberation 25 -basic constitutional goals in a Madisonian system. For all these reasons, a limit on
contributions to PACs should probably be thought very different from a
limit on an expenditure by a candidate on her own behalf,or by an ordinary citizen purchasing an advertisement on her own behalf to help
someone she likes. Related issues are of course raised by limits on contributions by PACs.
The Court has not clearly resolved the resulting conundrums. In the
two key cases, it gave conflicting signals. First, it invalidated a $1000 limit
on the amount of money that a PAC can give to promote the election of a
candidate. 26 In the Court's view, the PAC expenditure is core political
24. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
25. See Clawson et al.,
supra note 23, at 202-04.
26. See FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 482-83
(1985).
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speech, and because the money does not go directly to the candidate, the
risk and reality of corruption are not at stake. After all, PAC expenditures are not coordinated with the campaign and are in that sense
independent.
On the other hand, in the second case the Court upheld a $5000
limit on the amount of money an individual or group can give to any
PAC. 27 The Court said that this limit does not affect a wide range of
other possible expenditures designed to advocate political views, and that
Congress could reasonably decide that the limit was necessary to prevent
evasion of the limits on direct contributions. 28 The two cases are in obvious tension, and it is therefore unclear whether and how Congress may
constitutionally limit contributions to or by PACs. This is an especially
important question in light of the large and sometimes corrosive effects
of PACs on the political process.
C. Lochner, Redistribution, and Buckley
Let us put these various complexities to one side and return to the
basic issue of political equality. In rejecting the claim that controls on
financial expenditures could be justified as a means of promoting political equality, Buckley seems highly reminiscent of the pre-New Deal period. Indeed Buckley might well be seen as the modern-day analogue of
the infamous and discredited case of Lochner v. New York, 29 in which the
Court invalidated maximum hour laws.30
A principal problem with the pre-New Deal Court was that it treated
existing distributions of resources as if they were prepolitical and just,
and therefore invalidated democratic efforts at reform. 3 1 In a key Lochner
era case, Adkins v. Children's Hospital,for example, the Court invalidated
minimum wage legislation. 3 2 In so doing, it said:
To the extent that the sum fixed by [the minimum wage statute]
exceeds the fair value of the services rendered, it amounts to a
compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a
partially indigent person, for whose condition there rests upon
him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in effect, arbitrarwhich, if it belongs to anyily shifts to his shoulders a burden 33
body, belongs to society as a whole.
The language of compulsory subsidy-of taking from some for the benefit of others-was central in the Lochner period.3 4 Regulatory adjustment
of market arrangements was seen as interference with an otherwise law27. See California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1981).
28.
29.
30.
31.

See id. at 198-99.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
The link is explicitly made in Rawls, supra note 5, at 362-63.
This point is discussed in more detail in Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution

40-67 (1993).
32. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560-62 (1923).

33. Id. at 557-58.
34. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60-64 (1905).
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free and unobjectionable status quo. It was a state-mandated transfer of
funds from one group for another, and this kind of mandate was constitutionally illegitimate.
To compress a long and complex story: This whole approach became unsustainable in 1937, when the legal culture came to think that
existing distributions were a product of law, were not sacrosanct, and
could legitimately be subject to governmental correction. Throughout
the legal system, it was urged that property rights were a function of law
rather than nature, and ought not to be immunized from legal change.3 5
Such changes would not be banned in principle, but would be evaluated
on the basis of the particular reasons brought forward on their behalf. In
President Roosevelt's words: "We must lay hold of the fact that economic
laws are not made by nature. They are made by human beings."3 6 And
the Supreme Court, overruling Lochner itself, offered an uncanny reversal
of the Adkins dictum, arguing that "[t] he community is not bound to proT
vide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers. " 3
In its essential premises, Buckley is quite similar to the pre-1937 cases.
Recall that the Court announced that "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."3 8
It added that the "First Amendment's protection against governmental
abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a
person's financial ability to engage in public discussion."3 9 The Buckley
Court therefore saw campaign expenditure limits as a kind of "taking," or
compulsory exaction, from some for the benefit of others. The limits
were unconstitutional for this very reason. Just as the due process clause
once forbade government "interference" with the outcomes of the economic marketplace, so too the First Amendment now bans government
"interference" with the political marketplace, with the term "marketplace" understood quite literally. In this way Buckley replicates Lochner.
On the view reflected in both Buckley and Lochner, reliance on free
markets is government neutrality and government inaction. But in the
New Deal period, it became clear that reliance on markets simply entailed another-if in many ways good-regulatory system, made possible
and constituted through law. We cannot have a system of market ordering without an elaborate body of law.40 For all their beneficial qualities,
35. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8 (1927); Robert
L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470
(1923).
36. 1 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 657 (1938).
37. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
39. Id.
40. The point is made by the most eloquent defender of capitalism in the twentiethcentury: "The functioning of a competition... depends, above all, on the existence of an
appropriate legal system.... In no system that could be rationally defended would the
state just do nothing. An effective competitive system needs an intelligently designed and
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1398 1994
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markets are legitimately subject to democratic restructuring-at least
within certain limits-if the restructuring promises to deliver sufficient
benefits. This is a constitutional truism in the post-New Deal era. What is
perhaps not sufficiently appreciated, but what is equally true, is that elections based on existing distributions of wealth and entitlements also embody a regulatory system, made possible and constituted through law.
Here as elsewhere, law defines property interests; it specifies who owns
what, and who may do what with what is owned. The regulatory system
that we now have for elections is not obviously neutral or just. On the
contrary, it seems to be neither insofar as it permits high levels of political
influence to follow from large accumulations of wealth.
Because it involves speech, Buckley is in one sense even more striking
than Lochner. As I have noted, the goal of political equality is timehonored in the American constitutional tradition, as the goal of economic equality is not. Efforts to redress economic inequalities, or to ensure that they are not turned into political inequalities, should not be
seen as impermissible redistribution, or as the introduction of government regulation into a place where it did not exist before. A system of
unlimited campaign expenditures should be seen as a regulatory decision
to allow disparities in resources to be turned into disparities in political
influence. That may be the best decision, all things considered; but why
is it unconstitutional for government to attempt to replace this system
with an alternative? The Court offered no answer. Its analysis was startlingly cavalier. Campaign finance laws should b6 evaluated not through
axioms, but pragmatically in terms of their consequences for the system
41
of free expression.
continuously adjusted legal framework as much as any other." Friedrich A. Hayek, The
Road to Serfdom 38-39 (1944). Compare Arnartya Sen, Ingredients of Famine Analysis:
Availability and Entitlements, in Resources, Values and Development 452, 458 (1984):
In fact, in guarding ownership rights against the demands of the hungry, the legal
forces uphold entitlements, e.g. in the Bengal famine in 1943 the people who
died in front of well-stocked food shops protected by the state were denied food
because of lack of legal entitlement and not because of their entitlements being
violated.
41. ConsiderJohn Rawls' remarks:
The Court fails to recognize the essential point that the fair-value of the political
liberties is required for a just political procedure, and that to insure their fairvalue it is necessary to prevent those with greater property and wealth, and the
greater skills of organization which accompany them, from controlling the
electoral process to their advantage.... On [the Court's] view, democracy is a
kind of regulated rivalry between economic classes and interest groups in which
the outcome should properly depend on the ability and willingness of each to use
its financial resources and skills, admittedly very unequal, to make its desires felt.
John Rawis, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in Liberty, Equality, and Law: Selected
Tanner Lectures on Moral Philosophy 1, 76 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1987); see also
Rawls, supra note 5, at 324-31, 356-68; T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Content Regulation
Reconsidered, in Democracy and the Mass Media 331, 349-50 (Judith Lichtenberg ed.,
1990) ("It seems clearly mistaken to say that freedom of expression never licenses
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 1994
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THE PROBLEM OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

In principle, then, there are good arguments for campaign finance
restrictions. Insofar as Buckley rejects political equality as a legitimate
constitutional goal, it should be overruled. Indeed, the decision probably
ranks among the strongest candidates for overruling of the post-World
War II period. But there are real limits on how much we can learn from
abstract principles alone. Many of the key questions are insistently ones
of policy and fact. Was the system at issue in Buckley well-designed? How
might it be improved? What will be the real-world consequences of different plans? Will they fulfill their intended purposes? Will they be selfdefeating? Might they impair democratic processes under the guise of
promoting them?
My goal here is to offer a brief catalogue of ways in which campaign
finance legislation may prove unhelpful or counterproductive. My particular interest lies in the possibility that campaign finance legislation may
have perverse or unintended consequences. The catalogue bears directly
on a number of proposals now receiving attention in Congress and in the
executive branch. Of course it would be necessary to look at the details
in order to make a final assessment. I am describing possibilities, not
certainties, and a good deal of empirical work would be necessary to
come to terms with any of them.
A general point runs throughout the discussion. Although I have
criticized what the Court said in Buckley, considerable judicial suspicion
of campaign finance limits is justified by a simple point: Congressionalsupport for such limits is especially likely to reflect congressional self-dealing. Any
system of campaign finance limits raises the special spectre of governmental efforts to promote the interests of existing legislators. Indeed, it
is hard to imagine other kinds of legislation posing similarly severe risks.
In these circumstances, we might try to avoid rigid, command-and-control
regulation, which poses special dangers, and move instead toward more
flexible, incentive-based strategies.
A.

Unintended Consequences in Particular

1. Campaign Finance Limits May Entrench Incumbents. - Operating
under the rubric of democratic equality, campaign finance measures may
make it hard for challengers to overcome the effects of incumbency. The
problem is all the more severe in a period in which it is extremely difficult for challengers to unseat incumbents. Consider the following tables:

government to restrict the speech of some in order to allow others a better chance to be
heard.").
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TABLE 142
RE-ELECTION RATES
SENATE INCUMBENTS, RE-ELECrED, DEFEATED, OR RETIRED

Year Retired
1946
1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992

9
8
4
4
6
6
6
5
4
2
3
6
4
6
7
8
10
5
3
4
6
6

Total seeking Defeated in Defeated in
re-election
primaries general election
30
6
7
25
2
8
32
5
5
31
2
9
32
2
6
39
0
4
28
0
10
29
0
1
35
1
5
33
1
4
32
3
1
28
4
4
31
1
6
27
2
5
27
2
2
25
9
0
25
3
7
29
4
9
30
0
2
29
0
3
28
0
7
27
4
0
32
1
0
28
4
1

Total re- Re-elected as percentage of
elected
those seeking re-election

17

15
22
20
24

25
18
28
29
28
28
20
24

20
23
16
15
16
28

26
21
23
31
23

56.7%
60.0%
68.8%
64.5%
75.0%
86.2%
64.3%
96.6%
82.9%
84.8%
87.5%
71.4%
77.4%
74.1%

85.2%
64.0%
60.0%
55.2%
93.3%
89.7%
75.0%
85.2%
96.9%
82.1%

42. See NormanJ. Orenstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress 57 (1989-90) (source
for years 1946-88); Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 277 (1993) (source for years 1990-92).
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TABLE 2 4 3
RE-ELECTION RATES
HOUSE INCUMBENTS, RE-ELECTED, RETIRED, OR DEFEATED

Year

Retired

1948
1950

29
29
42
24
21
33
26
24
33
22
23
29
40
43
47
49
34
40
22
38
23

1952
1954
1956

1958
1960

1962
1964
1966
1968
1970

1972
1974

1976
1978
1980
1982
1984

1986
1988
1990
1992

Total
seeking
re-election

400
400
389
407
411
396
405
402
397
411

409
401
390

391
384
382
398
393
409
393
409
407
367

Defeated in
primaries

Defeated in
general
election

15
6
9
6
6
3
5
12

68
32
26
22
16

8
8
4

45
41

10
12
8
3
5
6
10

3
2
1
1
19

37

25
22
9
12
13
40

13
19
31
29
16
6
6
15
24

Re-elected as
percentage of

Total reelected

Re-elected as
percentage of
those seeking
re-election

317
362
354
379
389
356
375
368
344
362
396
379
365
343
368
358
361
354
390
385
402
391
324

79.3%
90.5%
91.0%
93.1%
94.6%
89.9%
92.6%
91.5%
86.6%
88.1%
96.8%
94.5%
93.6%
87.7%
95.8%
93.7%
90.7%
90.1%
95.4%
98.0%
98.3%
96.1%
88.3%

72.9%
83.2%
81.4%
87.1%
89.4%
81.8%
86.2%
84.6%
79.1%
83.2%
91.0%
87.1%
83.9%
78.9%
84.6%
82.3%
83.0%
81.4%
89.7%
88.5%
92.4%
89.9%
74.5%

House
membership

The risk of incumbent self-dealing becomes even more troublesome in
light of the fact that dissidents or challengers may be able to overcome
the advantages of incumbency only by amassing enormous sums of
money, either from their own pockets or from numerous or wealthy
supporters.4"
Consider in this regard the candidacy of Ross Perot. The Perot campaign raises many questions, but it is at least notable that large sums of
money proved an indispensable mechanism for enabling an outsider to
challenge the mainstream candidates. One lesson seems clear. Campaign finance limits threaten to eliminate one of the few means by which
incumbents can be seriously challenged.
There is particular reason to fear self-dealing in some of the proposals now attracting considerable enthusiasm in Congress. For example,
43. See NormanJ. Orenstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress 56 (1989-90) (source
for years 1946-88); Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 277 (1993) (source for years 1990-92).
44. See FrankJ. Sorauf, Money in American Elections 155-59 (1988).
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incumbent senators tend to have less difficulty in raising money than do
members of the House of Representatives. Members of the House are
therefore more dependent on PAC contributions. It should be unsurprising that while Senate bills propose a complete ban on multi-candidate
PACs, 45 the leading House bill proposes a much less draconian contribution limit of $2,500 per candidate. 46 More generally, the current proposals do nothing to decrease the benefits of incumbency, and they may well
increase those benefits. 47
Whether campaign finance limits in general do entrench incumbents is an empirical question. There is some evidence to the contrary.
Usually the largest amounts are spent by incumbents themselves; usually
incumbents have an advantage in accumulating enormous sums, often
from people who think that they have something to gain from a financial
relationship with an officeholder. 48 In these circumstances, one of the
particular problems for challengers is that they face special financial barriers by virtue of the ability of incumbents to raise large sums of money.
Probably the fairest generalization is that campaign finance limits in general do not entrench incumbents, but that there are important individual
cases in which such limits prevent challengers from mounting serious efforts. In any case, any campaign finance reforms should be designed so
as to promote more electoral competition.
2. Limits on Individual ContributionsWill ProduceMore (and More Influential) PACs. - The early regulation of individual contributions had an
important unintended consequence: It led directly to the rise of the
political action committee. When individuals were banned from contributing to campaigns, there was tremendous pressure to provide a mechanism for aggregating individual contributions. The modern PAC is the
result. Consider the following tables:

45. See S. 951, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1993); S. 7, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101

(1993); S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1993).
46. See H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (version 1) (1993).
47. Moreover, it is possible that lesser known challengers would be more likely to raise
funds through a more limited number of extremely generous donors. Certain types of
campaign finance restrictions could foreclose this avenue to a successful campaign for
people without the benefits of incumbency or a major party's backing. See Stephen E.
Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 213, 221
(1989).
48. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1160, 1176-78 (1994).
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TABLE 450
NUMBER OF

PoLmCAm

ACTION COMMITTEES, BY COMMITTEE TYPE:

1980 TO 1991
[AS OF DECEMBER 31,
COMMITTEE TYPE

1980

1985

Total ..................
2,551 3,992
Corporate ............... 1,206 1,710
Labor ...................
297
388
576
695
Trade/membership/health
Nonconnected ...........
374 1,003
42
54
Cooperative ..............
56
142
Corporation without stock

1986

1992]
1987

4,157 4,165
1,744 1,775
364
384
745
865
957
1,077
56
59
151
145

1989

1990

1991

4,268 4,178
1,816 1,796
354
349
786
777
1,115 1,060
59
59
138
137

1988

4,172
1,795
346
774
1,062
59
136

4,094
1,738
338
742
1,083
57
136

50. Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 287 (1993).
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The post-Buckley rise of PACs has a general implication. If individual
contributions are controlled while PACs face little or no effective regulation, there could be a large shift of resources in the direction of PACs. Of
course a combination of PAC limits and individual contribution limits
could counteract this problem. But limits of this kind create difficulties
52
of their own.

3. Limits on "HardMoney"Encourage a Shift to "Soft Money."- In the
1980s, the tightening of individual contribution limits-"hard money"helped increase the amount of "soft money,"5 3 consisting of gifts to political parties. It should not be surprising to see that in recent years there
has been an enormous increase in fund-raising by political parties, which
dispense contributions to various candidates. In 1980, the two parties
raised and spent about $19 million; in 1984, the amount rose to $19.6
million; in 1988, it increased to $45 million. 54 Consider the following
table:

52. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
53. Federal law exempts certain state and local activities-like voter registration and
grass roots campaign materials-from regulation. Funds for these activities are subject
only to state law, which often permits corporate and labor union political contributions.
See Alexander, supra note 10, at 66-67.
54. See id. at 67.
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In some ways the shift from hard to soft money has been a salutary
development. It is more difficult for soft money contributors to target
particular beneficiaries, and perhaps this reduces the risk of the quid pro
quo donation. Reasonable people could believe that soft money poses
lower risks to the integrity of the political process while also exemplifying
a legitimate form of freedom of speech and association. But the substitution, if it occurs, means that any contribution limits are easily evaded.
Candidates know, moreover, the identity of the large contributors to the
party, and for this reason soft money can produce risks of corruption as
well.
4. Limits on PACs Lead to an Increase in IndividualExpenditures. - In
the next few years, Congress may well impose limits on PACs, or even
eliminate them altogether.56 If it does so, there will be pressure for more
in the way of both individual contributions and individual expenditures. 57 Limits or bans on PAC expenditures will increase the forms of
financial help that Congress' original efforts in 1971 were specifically
designed to limit It is ironic but true that new legislation designed to
counteract PACs will spur the very activity against which Congress initially
sought to guard.
For reasons suggested above, 58 this development, even if ironic, may
improve things overall. There is a good argument that PAC contributions
are especially harmful to democratic processes, because they are particularly likely to be given with the specific purpose of influencing lawmakers.
It is also the case that candidates who receive individual contributions are
often unaware of the particular reason for the money, whereas PAC beneficiaries know exactly what reasons underlie any donation. For all these
reasons, a shift from PACs to individual expenditures may be desirable.
On the other hand, PACs have some distinctive benefits as well.
They provide a method by which individuals may band together in order
to exercise political influence. Sometimes they offer a helpful aggregative mechanism of the kind that is plausibly salutary in a democracy. A
shift from PACs to individual expenditures may be unfortunate insofar as
it diminishes the power of politically concerned people to organize and
pool their resources on behalf of their favored causes.
On balance, individual expenditures do seem preferable to PACs,
because the most severe threats to the "quid pro quo" and public deliberation come from PAC money. Restrictions on PACs that move people in
the direction of individual expenditures and contributions are therefore
desirable. My point is only that there is a trade-off between the two.
5. Limits on PACs Can Hurt OrganizedLabor and Minority Candidates.
Sometimes minority candidates can succeed only with the help of
PACs specifically organized for their particular benefit. For this reason,
56. Such measures are called for in the bills referred to supra notes 45-46.
57. Of course, some of these problems might be mitigated by a combination of limits
on PACs and individual contributions.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
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PAC limits will in some circumstances diminish the power of minority
candidates. The Congressional Black Caucus has expressed concerns
over campaign finance regulation on this ground.5 9 Similar results are
possible for PACs organized to benefit women. PAC restrictions may also
hurt organized labor. Currently labor PACs spend most of their money
on individual candidates, especially incumbent Democrats. 60 By contrast,
corporate PACs contribute about equally to Democrats and
Republicans, 6 1 and give substantial sums to the parties rather than to individual candidates. A ban on PACs may therefore diminish the influ62
ence of labor unions without materially affecting corporate PACs.
Perhaps these effects are good or justified on balance. But many people
who favor campaign finance regulation might be disturbed to see this
effect.
6. Limits on PACs May Increase Secret Gifts. - Many current interest
groups appear unconcerned about PAC limits, even though their interests would appear to be jeopardized by the proposed limits. 63 Perhaps it
will be easy for them to evade any such limits, especially by offering "soft
money" and also by assembling large amounts as a result of contributions
from unidentifiable sources. We lack detailed evidence on this issue, but
there is reason to think that the concern is legitimate. It is possible that
limits on PACs will make it harder to identify sources of money without
materially decreasing special interest funding. The current proposals do
not respond to this risk.
7. Limits on Both PACs and ContributionsCould Hinder CampaignActivity. - Most of the discussion thus far has been based on the assumption
that campaign finance reform proposals would limit either PACs or individual contributions. In either case, limitations on one could lead to increased spending through the other. A third option might be to limit
both PACs and individual contributions. But this option could quite possibly lead to a number of negative effects. If the limits were successful,
campaign activity might be sharply limited as a whole.64 Any such limit
would raise First Amendment problems and perhaps compromise democratic government. 65 Alternatively, resources could be funneled into
59. See Tim Curran, Campaign Finance Reform Bill Besieged by Four Separate
Democratic Factions, Roll Call, May 17, 1993, at 1, 20.
60. See John Theilmann & Al Wilhite, Discrimination and Congressional Campaign
Contributions 93 (1991).
61. See supra Table 3.
62. Of course labor strategies may shift with new campaign finance laws.
63. SeeJohnathon S. Cohn, Money Talks, Reform Walks, Am. Prospect, Fall 1993, at
61, 66.
64. See Gottlieb, supra note 47, at 213, 222 (limits on PACs and individual
contributions could drastically reduce campaign activity).
65. See Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections 164 (1980) ("If
competitive elections are an essential element of democracy-and it would be odd to
argue that they are not-the extent of democratic competition depends on candidates'
financial resources.").
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campaigns through "soft money," secret gifts, or other loopholes in the
reforms.
B. Possible Strategies
What I have said thus far suggests considerable reason for caution
about campaign finance proposals. It also suggests that those who design
such proposals should be attentive to the risks of futile or self-defeating
reform. I do not attempt here to describe a fully adequate regulatory
system. But I will outline two possibilities that appear especially promising. Both of them respond to the largely unfortunate American experience with command-and-control regulation in the last generation. Such
regulation-consisting of rigid mandates and flat bans-is peculiarly
likely to be futile or self-defeating. 66 Mandates and bans invite efforts at
circumvention. Because of their rigidity, they tend to have unintended
adverse consequences; creative members of regulated classes are likely to
come up with substitutes posing equal or greater risks.6 7 To say this is not
to say that mandates and bans are necessarily inferior to alternatives. But
it is to say that we ought to explore approaches that make self-interested
adaptation less likely.
1. Incentives Rather Than Bans. - The Buckley Court was unwilling
to accept a flat ban on expenditures. But it was quite hospitable to federal financing accompanied by viewpoint-neutral conditions-most notably a promise not to accept private money as a condition for receiving
federal dollars. 68 This model of incentives rather than bans has a
number of attractions. For one, it survives even the rigid constitutional
scrutiny of Buckley itself.
The system of incentives-in the form of federal financing accompanied by a promise not to accept private money-responds to the deepest
concerns of people who are skeptical of flat bans. Some people argue
that the acquisition of private sums can be at least a crude way to register
public enthusiasm for a candidate, and to enable dissidents and outsiders
to overcome the advantages of incumbency. A system of incentives leaves
the private remedy intact. At the same time, such a system can help
counteract the distortions built into exclusive reliance on private contributions. It does so by allowing electoral competition from people who
are not well-financed. 69
66. See Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 Md. L. Rev. 86, 97-98 (1986); Cass
R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 Duke LJ. 607, 627-31.
67. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 8, at 182; Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the
Regulatory State, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407, 413-29 (1990).
68. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-97 (1976).
69. Because legitimate justifications were at work, the campaign finance system with
such strings attached should not be regarded as including an unconstitutional condition.
On this point, the Buckley Court was quite right. See id. at 57 n.65.
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To be sure, some people think that full federal funding is the best
route for the future. 70 But a system of incentives promoting public financing is more likely to be constitutional. Full federal funding would
apparently foreclose private expenditures, in violation of Buckley; a system
of incentives does not eliminate private expenditures. Such a system allows the private check to continue to exist, a strategy that poses certain
risks, but that has benefits as well. Finally, a system of incentives accomplishes many (if not all) of the goals of full public funding. It does this by
encouraging candidates not to rely on private funds and by ensuring that
people unable to attract money are not placed at a special disadvantage.
A system of incentives could take various forms. Adapting the model
upheld in Buckley, the government might adopt a system of optional public financing, accompanied by (1) a promise not to accept or to use private money as a condition for receiving public funds and (2) a regime in
which public subsidies are provided to help candidates to match all or a
stated percentage of the expenditures of their privately financed opponents. Under (2), a candidate could elect to use private resources, but
the government would ensure that her opponent would not be at a substantial disadvantage. Of course any such system would raise many questions. We would, for example, have to decide which candidates would
qualify for support, and there is a risk that people would be unfairly excluded. We would also have to decide what sorts of disparities would be
tolerable between candidates raising substantial private funds and candidates relying on government. I suggest only that it is worthwhile to explore a system in which candidates are encouraged but not required to
accept only public funds, on the theory that such a system would be less
vulnerable to the various risks that I have described in this essay.
2. Vouchers. - An alternative approach has been suggested by
Bruce Ackerman. 7 1 Ackerman argues for an innovative voucher system,
in which voters would be given a special card-citizen vouchers in the
form of red, white, and blue money-to be used to finance political campaigns. Under this system, regular money could not be used at all. Candidates could attract citizen vouchers, but they could not use cash. The
goal would be to split the political and economic spheres sharply, so as to
ensure that resources accumulated in the economic sphere could not be
used for political advantage. Ackerman's approach is therefore closely
connected to the goal of preventing economic inequalities-fully acceptable in the American tradition-from becoming political in nature.
Obviously a system of this kind could not be implemented simply.
But it might have many advantages. Like any voucher system, such an
approach would reduce some of the problems posed by centralized, bureaucratic control of finances and elections. The requirement that candidates use a special kind of "money" could much simplify administration
70. See, e.g., Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 48, at 1189-1203.
71. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign
Finance, Am. Prospect, Spring 1993, at 71.
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and to some extent make it self-implementing. At the same time, the
system would be ideally suited to promoting political equality, and it
could do this without threatening to diminish aggregate levels of political
discussion. 7 2 Compared to the approach in Buckley, a voucher system
would leave candidates and citizens quite free to take and give as they
choose; but what would be taken and given would not be ordinary money,
and would be understood to have limited functions.
The voucher system would not be perfect. There would be a risk of
evasion here as well. It would not be simple to police the boundary between vouchers and ordinary money. Moreover, the line between campaign expenditures and usual political speech-which would be
unaffected by the proposal-is not crisp and simple. The flat ban on the
use of ordinary money could raise constitutional and policy objections.
Perhaps the ban would run afoul of Buckley, though I do not think that it
should. 73 A voucher system could also create distinctive implementation
problems. A bureaucratic apparatus would be necessary to provide the
vouchers, to decide on their aggregate amount, and to dispense them in
the first instance. A voucher system might not sufficiently promote the
goal of political deliberation, for candidates would be highly dependent
on private support. But no system is perfect. Because a voucher system
would so sharply separate the economic and political spheres, and allow
intensities of interest to be reflected in campaigns, it certainly warrants
serious consideration.
CONCLUSION

In principle, there are strong arguments for campaign finance limits,
especially if these are taken as part of a general effort to renew the old
aspiration of deliberative democracy. In some respects, the Supreme
Court's decision in Buckley is the modem analogue to Lochner v. New York,
offering an adventurous interpretation of the Constitution so as to invalidate a redistributive measure having and deserving broad democratic
support. The special problem with Buckley is that it permits economic
inequalities to be translated into political inequalities, and this is hardly a
goal of the constitutional structure. 74 Properly designed campaign finance measures ought to be seen as fully compatible with the system of
free expression, insofar as those measures promote the goal of ensuring a
deliberative democracy among political (though not economic) equals.
72. This depends on the assumption that the allocation of vouchers would be
designed with high levels of aggregate speech in mind.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41; see also Ackerman, supra note 71, at
77-78.
74. I do not suggest that courts should invalidate a system that allows economic

inequalities to become political inequalities; assessment of such matters is generally
beyond judicial competence. I suggest only that well-designed campaign finance
regulations are highly compatible with some defining constitutional commitments.
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There is, however, good reason for the Court and for citizens in general to distrust any campaign finance system enacted by Congress, whose
institutional self-interest makes this an especially worrisome area for national legislation. Moreover, the argument from principle does not suggest that any particular system will make things better rather than worse.
A number of imaginable systems would be futile or self-defeating, largely
because of unintended (or perhaps intended) bad consequences. In this
essay, I have tried to identify some of the most important risks.
My general conclusion is that dissatisfaction with Buckley, and enthusiasm for the goals of political equality and political deliberation, ought
not to deflect attention from some insistently empirical questions about
the real-world effects of campaign finance legislation. Any policy reforms
will have unanticipated consequences, some of them counter-productive.
Private adaptation to public-spirited reform is inevitable. In this context,
our task is not merely to debate the theoretical issues, but also to identify
the practical risks as systematically as possible, and to favor initiatives that
75
seem most likely to promote their salutary goals

75. The point suggests the need for public and private monitoring mechanisms, so as
to overcome the predictable problems of implementation.
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